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7. DOES COMPLIANCE WITH CODES OF CONDUCT MAKE 
WORKERS BETTER OFF?: A study at three garment factories in 
Vietnam 
D. Hoang 
Abstract: Over the past decades, there has been a growing number of corporate Codes of 
Conduct (CoC) being developed and introduced by multinational corporations (MNCs) to 
promote international labour standards in supply chains. This paper examines the 
implementation of CoC by suppliers in developing countries. A study was carried out at three 
garment factories in Vietnam that supply products to a number of well-known international 
brands. Findings of the research show that there are different levels of compliance with CoC 
although the three factories are requested to implement the same sets of CoC from similar 
buyers. The foreign owned factory, which has direct relationships with buyers, complies with 
most of the standards required in buyers’ CoC while the other two factories, which are 
subcontracted by intermediaries, violate the codes and deceive auditors to pass buyers’ audits. 
Nevertheless, workers working in the factory with high level of compliance do not seem to 
enjoy better working conditions and benefits than those who work at the non-complying 
factories. The study also found that in the non-complying factories, there is a high level of 
willingness of workers to collaborate with employers to deceive the auditors. The findings of 
the study raise the question whether CoC imposed by the MNCs practically help workers in 
developing countries.
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Introduction  
Over the past decade, concerns of labour standards and workers’ rights in global supply 
chains have been soaring. In the garment supply chain, most production activities take place 
in developing countries where material and labour costs for production are low. The majority 
of workers working in the export manufacturing sector are employed by locally owned 
factories rather than global companies (Elias, 2003). A large number of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have adopted corporate codes of conduct (CoC) as a voluntary-
regulatory measure to promote international labour standards in suppliers’ factories.   
Garment factories in the developing world have long been known to employ low paid young 
female workers who constantly have to work for long hours under poor workplace conditions, 
getting extremely low wage and they are often physically and psychologically abused (Yanz 
et al., 1999; Rao and Husain, 1991). The introduction of CoC aims to address these issues.  
After nearly two decades of CoC implementation, the improvement of labour standards and 
workers’ rights in the garment supply chain remains controversial. A great deal of research on 
CoC in global supply chains has been generated. However, the majority of the research in this 
field tends to place the focus on MNCs’ practices in implementing and enforcing the codes. 
Little is known about manufacturers’ practices in complying with the codes. There is almost 
no knowledge about workers’ experience as CoCs are being enforced. This paper seeks to 
address this gap by answering the question of how garment producers in Vietnam implement 
multiple corporate CoC introduced by international buyers and what benefits workers have 
from the enforcement of the codes.   
The following sections of the paper starts with a literature review of CoC’s application in 
supply chains, followed by the background information of the garment sector in Vietnam as 
well as its position in the global supply chain. Subsequently, the paper presents the method of 
data collection, findings and discussion. The paper ends with a conclusion and a 
recommendation for further research.  
Literature review: Codes of conduct in global supply chains  
During the last two decades, there was a growing number of CoC being developed and 
implemented by businesses. The issue of voluntary CoC has generated a good deal of 
research. A large number of publications in the field of CoC have also been produced. This 
section reviews the development of CoC literature on various aspects from the evolution to 
today’s application of the codes.   
From proliferation to standardization 
Since 1990s, thousands of CoC have been developed. The evolution of CoC in global supply 
chains is studied and reviewed by a number of scholars including Jenkins (2001), Frenkel and 
Scott (2002), Pearson and Seyfang (2001), Sethi (1999) and Ferguson (1998). One of the 
main debates is about the proliferation of CoC. Discussions are focusing limitations of the 
codes. They are including the heterogeneity of standards (Emmelhainz and Adams, 1999; 
Ferguson, 1998; Jenkins, 2001), limitation of scope of application to some export segments 
(Liubicic, 1998) and the coverage of the codes, which often excludes part time and home 
workers (Elias, 2003; Pearson and Seyfang, 2001; Ferguson, 1998). 
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Besides the development of CoC, there are a growing number of organisations which are 
dedicated to work on the issue of ethical supply chain and labour standards. Most of these 
organisations were established in the 1990s when the supply chain labour standards started 
being addressed widely in the public sphere. For example, the Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) 
was initiated by the British government in 1998, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) was 
developed by the Clinton administration task force in 1996, the Worker Rights Consortium 
(WRC) was created by US students activists in 1999, the Social Accountability International 
(SAI), which is a multi-stakeholder organization and the developer of the social 
accountability standards SA8000 was first introduced in 1997 and the Clean Clothes 
Campaign (CCC) began in the Netherlands in 1990s (Vogel, 2006). A rapid evolution of CSR 
institutions and standards has been addressed by Waddock (2008) who claims that there is a 
need for consolidation.  
Some initiatives have been developed aiming at resolving the issue of proliferation of the 
codes. In 2005 the Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers’ Rights 
programme was developed with the involvement of six organisations including Ethical 
Trading Initiative, Fair Labour Association, Clean Clothes Campaign, Fair Wear Foundation, 
Social Accountability International and Workers’ Rights Consortium. This joint programme 
aims to develop and implement a common set of CoC. In the same year, a working group 
within the International Organisation for Standardizations (ISO) was established to work on 
developing guidelines for social responsibility standards, which is known as ISO 26000. A 
recent article by Schwartz and Tilling (2009) criticises the standardized approach, which is 
unlikely efficient in a complex global supply chain context with multiple cultures.    
Application of CoC 
Besides the issue of heterogeneity of corporate codes, the implementation of CoC by MNCs 
is strongly criticised by both academia and NGOs. Auditing CoC compliance is the main 
activity in the ethical trade agenda of many MNCs. However, most MNCs outsource this 
activity to a third party, which is often commercial auditing firms. Laric (1999) criticises the 
use of profit-making auditors, who have limited understanding of human rights and labour 
issues. Prieto-Carron (2006) condemns the ‘ticking box’ audit method, which is offent used to 
assess suppliers’ compliance. The author argues that this method may not be able to identify 
worker’s rights issues such as discrimination, harrassment and freedom of association.  
There are also numerous discussions about the monitoring system set by MNCs. Some 
criticises the credibility of different parties invloved in auditing labour standards (Rodriguez-
Garavito, 2005; Locke et al., 2007) while others are sceptical about the sustainability of this 
voluntary practice (Vogel, 2006). Evidences from a number of studies show the failure of the 
system, which is unable to detect suppliers’ breaches (Egels-Zanden, 2007; Mccafferty, 2005; 
Roberts et al., 2006). Their studies show that suppliers have used various ways to deceive 
auditors. This somewhat proves that audit methods employed do not seem to work 
effectively.  
Nevertheless, some could argue that the failure of CoC is not necessarily because of the bad 
monitoring but lack of incentives for suppliers to comply. Corporate buying practices, such as 
squeezing suppliers on price, quality and time to a large extent force suppliers and their 
subcontractors into a non-compliance position (Jiang, 2009; Insight Investment, 2004). 
Pedersen and Andersen (2006) point out that the business case of ‘doing good’ does not 
always extend to all actors in the supply chains but mainly lies at the ones with brands.  
Factors affect the likelihood of suppliers’ compliance remain controversial. The study of 
Locke et al (2007) suggests that the variation in level of compliance of CoC by different 
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suppliers reflects the quality of legal regulations in the country where factories are located. 
Frenkel & Scott (2002) argue that the management styles of suppliers influence the quality of 
social performance while Boyd et al. (2007) claim that long term commitment, cost sharing 
and trust between buyers and supplier can improve compliance. However, Jiang’s work 
(2009) on testing different models of market governance claims that even the ‘promise’ of a 
long term contract with suppliers is not a sufficient condition to obtain suppliers’ 
commitment.  
In the clothing and footwear supply chains, products are often sourced from multiple tiers of 
suppliers of which many are hidden and out of reach of the CoC initiative. In many studies of 
CoC and supply chain labour standards, the term ‘suppliers’ often implies the primary 
suppliers who have contractual relationships with international brands and retailers. The 
implementation of CoC at the second and third tier suppliers has not been sufficiently studied.   
Consequence of CoC application 
The process of CoC implementation tends to put more emphasis on the issue of compliance 
than the consequential impacts of such compliance. Similarly, suppliers have a tendency to 
just pass the audits instead of working on the issues that the CoC address (Jiang, 2009). For 
example, CoC stops the use of child labour in factories but do not provide alternative 
arrangements of these children, who may suffer worse situations after being dismissed by 
factories (Kolk and Van Tulder, 2002). The objective of ‘child labour free’ may well be 
achieved on the expense of the children.  
Other argument is about the difference in perceptions of standards. What is regarded as ‘poor 
and unacceptable’ working conditions in the global North perhaps is a ‘privilege’ for factory 
workers in the global South since other alternatives are even worse (Kabeer, 2004; Kristof, 
2009). The lack of stakeholder consultations and the top down approach of CoC lead to the 
possibility that it may do more harm than good (Prieto-Carron et al., 2006).   
Many studies of CoC implementation tend to focus on business practices rather than the role 
of workers in the process. A recent research by Wells (2009) claims that CSR initiatives have 
little effect on enforcement of labour standards in developing countries. This author argues 
that local workers and their supporting stakeholder groups play vital roles to help themselves. 
Perhaps workers are not only victims or beneficiaries but they can also be active participants 
who have some influence in the compliance of CoC. Despite a large number of studies in the 
CoC literature, there is almost no knowledge about workers’ roles and experiences as CoC is 
implemented. This study aims to shorten this gap by exploring Vietnamese workers’ views 
and experience with CoC. 
The context of Vietnam & the garment industry  
Vietnam has been spotted as a cheap-labour destination compared to other countries in the 
Southeast Asia region. Minimum wage in Vietnam is significantly lower than many of its 
regional counterparts. In 2008, the minimum wage in China, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines is approximately USD117, 135, 108 and 120 respectively (ILO, 2009). In 
Vietnam, the highest minimum wage level is about USD 50
7
 a month. The main export 
                                                
7
 Government’s regulation on monthly minimum wage as at 01/01/2008 varies between 540,000vnd and 
1,000,000 vnd. Decree number 167 & 168/ND-CP dated 16/11/2007  
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markets for garment products from Vietnam are US, Japan, Germany, UK and Spain which 
together count for about three quarters of the total garment exports
8
.  
Most Vietnamese producers are subcontractors to East Asian companies, called ‘vendors’, 
based in Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Vietnamese producers are mainly 
responsible for ‘make-cut-trim’ processes, getting paid a processing fee and exporting 
finished products to developed countries (Thoburn, 2007). It is estimated that 80% of the total 
garment products in Vietnam are produced through contracts with vendors (IOE, 2001). 
There are almost no direct contractual relationships between Northern retailers/brands and 
Vietnamese producers. Many vendors, apart from outsourcing production, establish their own 
factories in Vietnam as their subsidiaries to carry out production activities. These subsidiaries 
often outsource some of their works to other local producers as sub-subcontractors.  
The industry consists of about two thousands garment factories, employing approximately 2.1 
million
9
 workers (CDI, 2006). Like elsewhere, the main workforce is formed by young single 
migrant female workers, aged between 18 and 25. On the average, migrants account for about 
63% of the total workers working in industrial zones across the country (Dang, 2008). 
Industrial actions are often wildcat strikes, which have been increasing in number in the 
recent years. Most disputes are over pay and working conditions (Clarke et al., 2007). Labour 
turnover can be as high as 35 to 40% as workers often move from one company to another to 
seek higher pay (CDI, 2006).  
The introduction of CoC and frequent audits at garment factories by international buyers is 
familiar to many export oriented producers so as workers working in the industry. 
Methods of data collection 
Selection of case studies 
Three large garment companies with recognized CSR initiatives were selected for the study. 
There are assumptions for this choice. Large companies are likely to be the suppliers to large 
international brands and retailers. If the large companies do not comply with CoC, it is 
unlikely small suppliers do. Workers working in large and reputable factories often get more 
benefit than those in small and medium sized ones. 
The three companies also represent three dominant types of garment companies in Vietnam. 
These are a foreign owned subsidiary, a partly state-owned and a domestic private-owned 
enterprise. This allows the study to compare the difference in the implementation of CoC 
under each management style as this may result in different impacts on workers. 
For the reason of anonymity, the three selected company will be named SOE (partly state-
owned enterprise), DPE (domestic private-owned enterprise) and FOE (foreign owned 
enterprise). These companies are relatively large in terms of numbers of full-time permanent 
workers, ranging from three thousand to more than six thousand workers. The average size is 
about one thousand in a typical garment company in Vietnam. 
The three companies are recognised by the industry as good social performers. SOE and FOE 
are SA8000 certified facilities while DPE has gotten several National CSR awards. This 
makes the three companies comparable in terms of social performance.  
                                                
8
 Data obtained from the online database of UN comtrade with statistics updated in 2009.   
9
 Statistic from the Decision 36/2008/Q-TTg of the Prime Minister approving the development strategy of 
textile and garment industry of Vietnam up to 2020.  
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Collection of data 
Twenty in-depth interviews with factory managers, trade union representatives and workers 
were conducted at the three factories by using semi-structured questionnaires. Interviews with 
company managers and Trade Union representatives were conducted face – to – face at 
companies’ offices. Interviews with workers were conducted confidentially via telephone 
outside working hours.  
Approaching workers was more difficult than anticipated. A plan of meeting workers outside 
factory premises for face-to-face interviews was not possible as most workers did not finish 
work until dark and usually worked seven days a week. Contacts with workers were obtained 
through a network of friends who have connections with people in the factories’ locations. 
Fifteen workers were approached and interviewed via telephone. Each telephone interview 
took about an hour and was normally conducted at late evening between 9 to 10 pm after the 
workers finished work and had come back to their accommodation.  
Half of the interviewed workers were introduced by intermediaries and the other half was 
recommended by the workers themselves. For example, an intermediary introduces one or 
two workers in the factory of concern. From these workers, the researcher is introduced to 
other workers for interviews. This selection is not entirely random. However, this method 
provides a great level of trust between the interviewer and respondents from whom the 
researcher can obtain mostly trustworthy information.   
Findings 
Which CoC are required to be implemented? 
The number of CoC that the garment companies have to comply with depends on the number 
and the type of customers these companies have. As the state-owned enterprise (SOE) and the 
domestic private enterprise (DPE) supply many customers, including well-known 
international brands, each company has to comply with about ten to fifteen sets of CoC. Half 
of their customers, including some EU and Japanese buyers, do not have CoC and do not 
implement any monitoring activity. Unlike SOE and DPE, the foreign owned enterprise 
(FOE) has only three customers and is subjected to three sets of CoC.   
The table 1 (next page)shows a list of buyers with CoC. In total, twelve sets of CoC were 
provided by the three companies
10
. 
                                                
10
 Copies of CoCs were provided by factories’ managers at the time of research between June-August 2008. The 
content of these codes may have been revised by the brands.   
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Table 1 
Buyers\ Factories SOE DPE FOE 
Gap   
Wal-mart   
AEO   
C&A  
Timberlands  
Levi Strauss  
Sears  
Kohl’s  
Zara (Inditex)    
Columbia  
Perry Ellis Int’l    
Target Corporation    
An analysis of the twelve different sets of CoC shows some variations in the required 
standards. For example, requirements of maximum weekly work hours and overtime vary 
from 60 to 72 hours with some exceptions. All twelve codes prohibit the use of child labour 
but apply different minimum ages, which range from 14 to 16. Only two codes specify some 
protection measures of women workers in terms of women’s rights, job security, health and 
safety. Notably, standards in most codes are generally less strict than mandatory requirements 
in the labour law. Interviews with three factories’ managers reveal that buyers have different 
ways of monitoring compliance. Some buyers audit suppliers’ performance against standards 
in the labour law, which are generally stricter than what is stated in the CoC, while others 
check against standards in their own CoC. Frequency of monitoring varies between every 4 to 
12 months.  
Buyers have different audit schedules and can conduct factory visits at any time with or 
without notice. Suppliers must accept this condition although they are not very happy with the 
situation. A manager of SOE complains that sometimes the factory has ten audits in a week 
and for each audit they have to prepare almost forty types of records and documents to 
present to auditors. Each factory assigns at least one staff working full time on compliance 
related issue. 
According to managers from the three factories, buyers are generally happy with their 
compliance. Some copies of audit reports were shown with comments from auditors that no 
serious violation of CoC standards is found. Minor corrective actions are recommended such 
as record keeping and signposts installation in the factory. Managers are proud of their 
factories’ social performance which helps further the relationships with buyers.  However, 
workers’ experience about the implementation of CoC is rather different. 
How are labour standards implemented? 
Interviews with fifteen workers and two trade union representatives reveal that among the 
three factories, the FOE complies with most requirements in the labour law and buyers’ 
codes. SOE and DPE fail to comply with many standards but have been deceiving auditors to 
pass audits. DPE also get national awards and certificates of merit for the social performance.   
All interviewed workers are aware of CoC required by buying companies. The workers seem 
to be familiar with the existence of multiple CoC and frequent labour standards audits at the 
factories. “They [the codes] are all over places”, as one worker puts it. Although experience 
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of CoC implementation is different in each factory, most interviewed workers do not think the 
CoC and the monitoring system implemented by buyers have sufficiently addressed their 
needs.  
At the non-complied factories, SOE and DPE, workers view the CoC compliance as ‘playing 
game’ with auditors.  
‘It is like playing a game ... (giggling). When we know they [auditors] are coming, we all 
scurry here and there to get things in order, tidy up our work place, remind each other of 
what to say to them. It is funny…(giggling)’ (a worker at SOE)  
At the complying factory, FOE, workers claim that managers usually use the excuse of 
compliance to deny workers’ requests such as pay increase and other benefits.  
They [managers] said they complied with the law, if we wanted more we’d better wait until 
the law was amended. We knew that kind of answers. The quickest way was to go on strike. I 
have been working here for almost five years. They never took initiative to increase pay for us 
unless the minimum wage is changed or we went on strike. (a worker of FOE) 
Work hours 
Workers at FOE, the factory which complies with the labour law, usually work 8 hours a day 
and have Sunday off. Occasionally workers are required to work overtime but this only lasts 
for a short period of time to complete orders. In contrast, workers at SOE and DPE work 
overtime of at least 700 hours per annum, more than double of what is allowed by law and 
also higher than buyers’ standards. Regularly working hours are about 10 to 11 hours a day 
and occasionally workers can have one or two Sundays off a month.  
At FOE female workers of seven month pregnancy and young workers between 15 and 18 
years old only have to work maximum 7 hours a day. This standard is not explicitly required 
by buyers’ codes but stipulated by the labour law. Nevertheless, this privilege is not applied 
in the two companies, SOE and DPE. All workers, regardless status, work the same number 
of hours.  
The two companies have managed to hide the breach of working hours. At SOE, line 
managers often falsify records which are used to show to auditors. At DPE, there is a more 
sophisticated way of cheating. This company uses automatic timing system for checking 
attendance. This practice is highly appreciated by buyers as it is more difficult to falsify 
compared to hand written attendance cards. However, the company can still deceive by 
asking workers to check out in time, say, at 5pm or 6pm every day and then come back to 
work as normal.  
Wage & benefits 
Working hours at the three factories do greatly affect workers’ earnings. Although minimum 
wage applied to domestic companies is 20% lower than their foreign owned counterparts, 
workers at SOE and DPE have no worry about minimum wage. Their average earning is paid 
per piece and workers usually earn double or even triple of the stipulated minimum wage.  
Unlike SOE and DPE, FOE pays workers a monthly wage which is slightly higher than the 
minimum wage. Workers are also paid overtime rates of at least 150%. Nevertheless, their 
basic salary is low therefore their overtime payment is not significant. In addition, workers at 
FOE do not have to work overtime very often. Therefore on average they earn significantly 
less than what workers at the other companies do. All interviewed workers at FOE express 
their disappointment about their low wage and ability to earn more. 
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Harassment and abuse 
Verbal abuse is common in all three factories, but it seems to be worst at FOE. At FOE, there 
is a strict regulation at work place that workers are not allowed to talk or walk around during 
working hours. Line managers strictly supervise workers’ performance and often shout at 
them whenever they think workers are not working hard enough.  
Sexual harassment is also the case at FOE, but most of the workers do not think the incidents 
are offending. All interviewed workers at FOE claim that sometimes they see foreign & 
Vietnamese male managers addressing and touching young female workers on factory floors 
but none of them see that as harassment. As the majority of line managers are Vietnamese 
females these cases are rare, however.  
Discrimination & unequal remuneration 
Most interviewed workers do not know what discrimination means. In buyers’ codes 
suppliers are requested not to discriminate against workers in terms of race, gender, religion, 
nationality, political stance or disability. These conditions are rarely applicable in garment 
factories in Vietnam since the majority of workers are women. There are almost no 
differences in race, religion, nationality and political stance among workers. Women workers 
at SOE and DPE even earn more than male workers for the same job as their productivity is 
higher.  
However, the most common problem, which is not often specified in the codes, is that line 
managers often treat workers unequally. If a worker is favoured by a line manager, she will 
be given more benefits and less difficult jobs. At FOE, pregnant workers and workers with 
small children are paid lower bonuses and get nothing or very little salary increase compared 
to normal workers. This creates a great deal of problems in employment relations and even 
leads to strikes in some cases. According to a manager of FOE, unequal remuneration due to 
line managers’ discretion is the most frequent complaint that the company hears from 
workers. Company managers in all the three companies view this as a ‘non-avoidable’ matter 
and that is a typical ‘women issue’. Buyers do not seem to pay attention to this problem as it 
is not considered as a human rights matter.  
Age discrimination is common practice in all three companies. Young and unmarried workers 
are favoured due to their obedience, relatively higher productivity and lower cost. In DPE 
factories, workers above 35 are asked to resign voluntarily or otherwise they will be 
transferred to do other work such as cleaning or packaging. CoC audits often focus on 
workers in production lines while much less attention is paid to other types of work in the 
factory. Auditors usually investigate discrimination among current workers but not those who 
have been forced to leave nor those who never have a chance to be employed.   
Freedom of association and collective bargaining 
All three companies have officially recognized trade unions. Although the terms of reference 
for the trade unions are similar, each company has its own way of organising the trade union. 
At DPE, the chairman of the Trade Union (TU) is a vice director of the company. At SOE, the 
chairwoman of TU is the deputy head of the business department of the company while at 
FOE, the position holder is a nurse who is appointed by the company’s manager. Regarding 
the function of TU protecting workers’ rights and interest, most workers think that TUs at 
their factories are useless.  
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What is the difference between compliance and non-compliance?  
Workers at DPE and SOE are found to be committed to their companies. In the interviews, 
these workers express their sympathy with the companies and they are willing to support their 
employers by deceiving auditors and inspectors. Workers want their companies to be able to 
get large orders from large buyers, which they believe will improve their income.  
All interviewed workers in DPE and SOE reported that there is no compensation or 
punishment measure even if some workers failed to report positively. Workers are well 
informed about the result of audit reports, awards or sanctions by clients. Most workers feel 
they are responsible for a ‘collective good’ by saying positive things about the factory. 
Although workers are coached by managers and their colleagues, they are mainly ‘learning by 
doing’.  
Auditors are getting smarter. They themselves select workers for interviews. They do not ask 
someone like me (smile), they ask young, fresh looking girls. These girls sometimes do not 
really know how to lie… so there it goes…(laugh). They’ll make it better next time (a worker 
of DPE) 
Although FOE complies with most requirements of buyers’ CoC and the labour law, workers 
are less happy than those in the other two companies. Workers do not have to work long 
hours overtime but they don’t earn much either. They are subjected to strict discipline at the 
work place with high intensity of work load.  
CoC protects workers from wage deduction punishments but does not safeguard the right to 
work. A worker from FOE describes a policy which does not seem to be the concern of CoC.    
‘We are requested to be at the work place at least 10 minutes earlier than working time so we 
can be ready to start working in time. If I am late, they [the guards] will not let me in. That 
means I have to go home and get no pay for that day. One time I arrived early but I forgot my 
attendant card at home to check in. They did not let me in. So I had that day as a no pay 
leave’ (a worker of FOE)  
Beside various complaints and disappointments, workers at FOE, however, appreciate that the 
CoC system has resolved one problem regarding the policy of ‘toilet cards’. Before, the 
factory issued toilet cards for each production line, which includes about 30 to 35 workers. 
This limits the number of workers going to the toilet at one time and also limits the time they 
spend in there. After several buyers’ audits, the company was asked to cease this policy.  
Discussion  
The study at three factories reveals a remarkable fact, which shows that not only factory 
managers but also workers do not seem to appreciate the CoC initiative. There appear to be a 
high level of workers’ willingness and commitment to support their employers in deceiving 
on compliance. There are two implications for this.
Firstly, the phenomenon of workers being supportive to the factories’ managers to a large 
extent explains why intensive audits are unable to detect breaches. Most audits involve 
interviews with workers to verify labour practices in the factory. Some MNCs report that they 
also conduct off-site interviews with workers while others claim that they apply unannounced 
factory visits. These efforts are unlikely effective if workers are not willing to tell the truth.   
Secondly, the experience of close collaboration between workers and manager in this study 
challenges the ethical intentions of CoC, which aims to empower workers against their 
employers. Findings learnt from this study shows that workers stand on their employers’ side 
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to betray labour auditors. Unlike the experience from previous studies that workers obey their 
employers due to a fear of being fired or punished for non-collaboration (Smith et al., 2006; 
Welford and Frost, 2006; Egels-Zanden, 2007), this study found that workers share the same 
incentives as their employers. Workers believe they can be better off if the factories have 
larger orders and better prices.  
The issue of compliance and its effects on workers’ benefits and working conditions can be 
discussed from various perspectives. For example, one could argue that MNCs have not done 
enough to properly enforce the codes or support suppliers. Others may want to analyse the 
case from the management perspectives such as organisational culture and management styles 
of the factories influence the level of compliance and workers’ welfares. In this paper I will 
discuss the findings from the workers’ perspectives.    
The codes aim to establish labour standards that would serve workers’ interests. Although the 
principles of labour standards and workers’ rights are widely accepted, compliance with CoC 
results in a certain trade off which workers may not wish to make. Workers, perhaps in the 
short term, have their own priority regarding working time and level of income. Findings 
from this study show that workers tend to prefer the choice of more earning rather than less 
working hours if they cannot have both. The enforcement of corporate CoC in the factories 
means workers have no choice but must accept the standards that are believed to be good for 
them.    
Workers at the bottom of the supply chain are regarded as victims of unethical business 
practices and are suppose to be the beneficiaries of ethical trading initiatives such as CoC. 
While the former is rather obvious, the latter is far from certain.  
The model of a ‘complying factory’ appears to have various problems that the codes fail to 
address. For example, the clause of ‘working hours are not excessive’ protects workers from 
the number of hours but not the intensity of work within those hours. Since the work hours 
are capped, say not more than 8 hours a day, workers are under great pressure to work harder 
to complete the amount of work that may have been done in more than 8 hours.  
The prohibitions of ‘deductions from wages as a disciplinary measure’ create an incentive to 
transform the measure from ‘deduction’ to ‘no wage at all’. What have been found at the FOE 
factory in this study shows that workers are punished for turning up to work late by a ‘no pay 
leave’ day, which is much worse than the deduction of thirty minutes or so of wage. 
Compliance does not always mean better conditions to workers but rather implies ‘low risk’ 
to buyers. A recent study by this author at a number of UK retailers reveals that international 
buyers are well aware of workers’ interest in working overtime. The CSR report of a giant 
retailer states a common problem in China and Southeast Asia factories that the majority of 
workers are found “happy to work long hours” to be able to save more money for their 
families in home villages (Next, 2005 p.12). However, to comply with the codes, workers are 
not allowed to work overtime. Behind the ethical concern about workers’ health, there is an 
implicit understanding that it is too risky for brands’ images not to stop the overtime 
practices.  
The findings show that the enforcement of CoC seems to be counterproductive. Workers 
working at the factory with higher level of compliance do not seem to enjoy better benefits 
and conditions than those who work for factories with less compliance. Suppliers can be in 
compliance while still maintaining exploitative measures. The enforcement of CoC in this 
instance unlikely improves workers’ life. 
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Conclusion  
This paper has presented a comparative study of CoC implementation in three garment 
factories in Vietnam. Results from the study show two different practices in complying with 
buyers’ CoC. Two suppliers who fail to comply with the codes have supports from workers in 
hiding breaches. One supplier who complies with most of standards in the codes is not 
appreciated by workers. This paradox is because compliance results in a certain trade off 
between working time and income, which workers may not wish to make. In compliance, 
exploitative measures are not eliminated but are transformed to different formats, which in 
some cases is even worse. The author argues that complying with the current form of CoC 
does not necessarily mean workers will enjoy better working conditions and benefits. In 
contrast, workers’ may support non compliance standards, since this may be more beneficial 
for them.   
Although the study involves a small number of workers and factories, its findings can be the 
basis for a further research in the area. A larger scale of study, which may include the effects 
of CoC on workers’ life beyond factories’, may better examine the impacts of CoC.   
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